Engagement or Estrangement?

Ehsan Mehmood Khan
USA's current counterterrorism commitment in South Asia is a complex policy chore, wherein hosts of players are engaged. The involved parties are seemingly aligning with the US in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) but are struggling to pursue their unstated national interests on the sidelines taking advantage of the regional security environment.
Some of the states, ostensibly part of the counterterror alliance, are just trying to make hay as the sun of their fortune has started shining amidst the security issues faced by the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has further worsened the security landscape of South Asia. The US Administration, too, is on one hand serious in defeating the menace of terrorism, but on the other looking across the curtain of terrorism. This has rather heightened the conventional tension in the region.
The two nations that really bore the brunt of terrorism are the US and Pakistan. Both had enough of human loss besides mammoth economic cost. Realistically speaking, it is mainly the US fighting a war worth name on northeastern side of the Hindukush and Pakistan on the southeastern side. What's more, the Pak-US partnership is not a newfound phenomenon. Pakistan stood with the US through the years of the Cold War in the face of declared threats by the erstwhile USSR.
Pakistan sided with the US during the Korean War and the War in Vietnam. It remained an active member of SEATO and CENTO. It also helped bridge the Sino-US Gulf. Pak-US partnership saw climax against the Russian misadventure in Afghanistan during the decade of 80s. Lately, Pakistan decided to provide unstinted support to the US-led GWOT in the aftermath of 9/11.
The type of political, military, intelligence and logistics support being provided by Pakistan to the US in the ongoing war is actually not completely known to the American populace. Nevertheless, while the US is situated thousands of miles away from the physical battle-space, Pakistan is located in the heartland of battlefield. It has, in reality, put itself in peril at the hands of local and global terrorist organisations owing to its support to the US. The terrorists have given ultimatum to Pakistan as a state and society that they would keep targeting them if they continue supporting the US.
Albeit the difficulty of recording correct war casualties, according to the Institute of Conflict Management, Pakistan lost 1865 security personnel and 5291 civilians from 2003 to 2008. During 2009, it further lost 780 security personnel and 1780 civilians. This denotes that Pakistan has faced countless 9/11s bit by bit. Besides, the GWOT has cost over $ 35 billion to Pakistan's slim economy. It is estimated to cost around $8 billion per annum from now on. It is of note that Pakistan's annual national budget is just about double this figure.
US Administration is cognisant of the vitality of role being played by Pakistan. It also appreciates the intent, limitations and capabilities of Pakistan. Yet, there are certain points of discord causing friction within the Pakistan-US strategic partnership. The role of Xe Services (earlier Blackwater) in Pakistan has sown a seed of skepticism between the two partners. Blackwater is seen by many as a private mercenary army and does not have an appreciable record considering its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The issue of US drone strikes inside Pakistani territory violating the sovereignty of the state is yet another thorn.
In addition, Indian role in Afghanistan, their involvement in Pakistan's internal affairs exploiting their presence along Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the USA's strategic silence on the issue is feared to doom Pak-US partnership.
Above all, AfPak is a misplaced piece of strategic communication if the ultimate aim is to defeat terrorism, which is indeed the stated goal of US Administration. AfPak sounds like taming the two states rather than defeating the militant organisations like Taliban and al Qaeda. If we are sincere in defeating terrorism, we need to move towards "lateral engagement" rather than "strategic estrangement".
Hence, without bogging down into terms and terminologies, let us move on to play our respective parts while respecting each other's point of view, giving credence to each other's intent and potential, and embedding a policy of non-violation of each other's sovereignty both in usages of words and weapons. The grand strategic finale for the US Administration would, certainly, be to take the bull of India-Pakistan friction by its horns and resolve the unfinished agendas of partition like Kashmir, Sir Creek and river water distribution. This would, for sure, be a masterpiece of both global and regional strategy by the US Government, and would have a positive effect on the current War on Terror, besides uplifting its image in the region.
In the light of discussion in the preceding lines, US Administration is recommended to alter is regional strategic design as follows (1) A paradigm shift should be made in the regional policy from AfPak to Indo-Pak with accent on resolution of the impending disputes; (2) In order to boost the counterterrorism potential of Pakistan's security forces, Pakistan should be given the Predators technology rather than the shadow drones as committed by Secretary Gates during his recent visit to Pakistan; (3) Seize covert operations in Pakistan being conducted by Xe; (4) And finally, avoid controversial statements on sensitive issues.
Such steps would surely work for trusted cooperation between the two partners in the days to come.
The writer is a fellow of NDU, Washington DC