In Pakistan, committing a crime can impose a heavy cost on the victim, but the financial burden of pursuing justice often falls on someone who has committed no crime at all: the taxpayer. From police investigations and prosecution to court proceedings, prison accommodation, food, security and medical care, the state spends public money maintaining a criminal justice system that frequently struggles to deliver timely and effective justice.
The question is simple but uncomfortable: who pays the cost of crime in Pakistan, and why should an already struggling nation continue to bear the financial consequences of an inefficient criminal justice system?
Pakistan's economic difficulties make this question particularly important. When the government struggles to finance schools, hospitals, clean water, public transport and basic social protection, every rupee spent by a public institution must deliver a meaningful public benefit. Justice is indispensable, but a system that consumes resources without producing timely outcomes demands serious scrutiny.
Pakistan's criminal justice system involves several interconnected institutions: the police, investigative agencies, prosecutors, courts, prisons and probation services. Each has a legitimate responsibility. Yet when investigations are defective, evidence is mishandled, witnesses are inadequately protected, prosecutors are unprepared and hearings are repeatedly postponed, the financial burden multiplies.
A criminal case may begin with a police report and end years later with a conviction, acquittal or dismissal. During that period, the state pays for investigation, court administration, prosecution and, where detention is ordered, prison accommodation and maintenance. The victim may meanwhile struggle to obtain compensation, recover stolen property or receive closure.
The problem is not that the state spends money on justice. The problem is that public expenditure can continue even when institutional performance remains unsatisfactory.
The latest available national prison figures make the scale of the challenge clear. According to the 2026 Pakistan Prison Data Report, published by the National Commission for Human Rights and Justice Project Pakistan, the country held 110,513 prisoners against an authorised capacity of 68,832. Approximately 75 per cent were awaiting trial. These figures point to a system under considerable pressure, in which detention frequently precedes a final judicial determination.
Prisons are intended to enforce lawful sentences, maintain custody and support rehabilitation. In practice, Pakistan's overcrowded prisons are also holding tens of thousands of people whose cases have not yet concluded.
This raises a fundamental question about the cost of delayed justice. Why should an accused person remain in detention for an extended period because an investigation is incomplete, a prosecutor is unprepared, a witness is absent or a court cannot hear the case promptly?
The state must provide food, security, sanitation and medical care to people in its custody. These are not optional luxuries. They are part of its legal and constitutional responsibilities. Article 10A of the Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process, while the state's duty to protect the life and dignity of detained persons cannot simply be abandoned because public finances are strained.
Nevertheless, the public should be entitled to ask whether every detention is necessary, every adjournment justified and every prison expenditure properly managed.
A prison cannot reasonably be described as a place of privilege merely because it provides food and shelter. Overcrowding, inadequate healthcare and poor living conditions are documented problems in Pakistan's prison system. The real concern is not that prisoners receive necessities, but that the state may spend heavily on prolonged detention without resolving cases efficiently.
A prison should never become a substitute for a functioning justice system. One proposal deserves serious public debate: should people convicted of crimes contribute towards the cost of their imprisonment?
There is an understandable argument that a person who deliberately harms society should, where legally and financially feasible, bear some of the consequences of that conduct. If a convicted offender has substantial assets, has unlawfully obtained wealth or has caused measurable financial loss, the law should provide effective mechanisms to recover criminal proceeds, enforce restitution and award compensation to victims.
Courts may also consider lawful fines, confiscation of criminal proceeds and other financial penalties where the relevant law permits them. However, a distinction must be made between recovering money from a convicted offender and charging every prisoner the full cost of incarceration.
Many offenders are poor. Some have no income or assets. Imposing an unpayable prison bill could create a new cycle of debt, punish families who were not responsible for the offence and make rehabilitation more difficult. A person should not remain imprisoned longer merely because they cannot afford their maintenance costs.
Nor should an accused person be charged as though guilt has already been established. In Pakistan, as in any constitutional system, accusation is not conviction. A person acquitted of a charge should not be treated as a criminal simply because the state arrested and prosecuted them.
The more defensible approach is to recover costs through legally authorised fines, victim compensation, restitution and confiscation of criminal proceeds after due process. Any scheme involving prison maintenance charges would require clear legislation, safeguards for indigent prisoners and protection against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
The other side of the question is equally important. When a case ends in acquittal, should the police officer who conducted a defective investigation automatically be punished? Should a prosecutor be held responsible whenever the evidence fails to secure a conviction? Should a judge be blamed for every acquittal?
No. Such an approach would be unjust and would undermine the independence of the criminal justice system. An acquittal does not necessarily mean that the police acted dishonestly or that the prosecution was incompetent. Evidence may be insufficient, witnesses may turn hostile, or the court may reasonably find that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
But the public is entitled to demand accountability when an independent inquiry establishes deliberate fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, corruption, wilful neglect of duty, unlawful detention or serious professional misconduct.
The same principle applies to unjustified judicial delays and administrative failures. Accountability must be based on demonstrable misconduct, established procedures and the right of the concerned official to respond. It must not become a mechanism for pressuring judges to convict more people.
The objective is not to increase convictions at any cost. It is to ensure that the guilty are lawfully convicted, the innocent are protected and public resources are not wasted throgh negligence or abuse.  Pakistan's criminal justice system needs a transparent method of measuring the cost and performance of every stage of a criminal case.
Police departments should publish information about investigation expenditure, case completion, forensic capacity and complaints of misconduct. Prosecution services should disclose case outcomes, reasons for major delays and the quality of case preparation. Courts should improve the monitoring of adjournments and pending cases while protecting judicial independence. Prison departments should publish expenditure per inmate, healthcare costs, staffing costs and the results of rehabilitation programmes.
Such reporting would help answer a question that is rarely discussed with sufficient seriousness: how much does the state spend on a criminal case, how long does it take to conclude, and what outcome does the public receive?
A case that remains unresolved for five years should not be treated as an ordinary administrative inconvenience. It represents costs to the taxpayer, uncertainty for the accused, distress for the victim and a potential loss of public confidence.
Where deliberate misconduct is proved, disciplinary action and lawful recovery of losses should follow. Where the problem is a shortage of judges, prosecutors, forensic facilities or trained investigators, the response should be institutional reform rather than scapegoating.
Five reforms that could reduce the burden
First, introduce a transparent criminal justice cost framework. The federal and provincial governments should calculate and publish the average cost of investigation, prosecution, trial and imprisonment, with clear explanations of how public money is spent.
Second, recover legally recoverable costs from convicted offenders. Courts should make effective use of lawful fines, restitution, compensation orders and confiscation of criminal proceeds. Any additional prison-cost recovery scheme should be carefully legislated and should exempt people who cannot reasonably afford to pay.
Third, establish accountability for proven misconduct. Independent oversight should investigate fabricated cases, corruption, deliberate investigative failures, unlawful detention and unjustified administrative delays. Penalties must follow evidence and due process, not merely an acquittal or an unsuccessful prosecution.
Fourth, reduce unnecessary detention. Bail, probation, parole, diversion and community service should be used where the law permits and the circumstances justify them. Serious offenders and people who pose a genuine risk must be dealt with appropriately, but detention should not become the automatic response to every accusation.
Fifth, make rehabilitation economically meaningful. Voluntary and properly regulated vocational training, education and lawful work programmes can help eligible prisoners acquire skills and reintegrate into society. Any paid work must comply with applicable law and protect prisoners from exploitation. The objective should be to reduce repeat offending and future public expenditure, not to turn prisons into profit-making enterprises.
Justice must be affordable, but never discriminatory
There is a danger in discussing the cost of crime exclusively in financial terms. A wealthy offender must not be able to purchase better treatment, while a poor accused person is denied liberty because they cannot afford bail or prison charges. Nor should a person's ability to pay determine whether they receive a fair trial.
Justice must remain equal before the law. The state cannot abandon its responsibility to investigate crime, protect victims, prosecute offenders and maintain lawful custody. These functions are essential even when the economy is weak.
But constitutional responsibility does not excuse waste, inefficiency or institutional indifference. On the contrary, limited resources make responsible administration more urgent.
Pakistan cannot solve its prison crisis simply by constructing more jails or increasing expenditure. It must examine why so many people enter detention, why cases take so long to conclude, why criminal proceedings sometimes fail and why rehabilitation remains insufficient.
The price of justice must not become the price of failure
The cost of being a criminal is not limited to a prison sentence. It includes the harm inflicted on victims, the loss suffered by families, the damage to public safety and the financial burden imposed on society. Yet when the criminal justice system fails to function efficiently, the taxpayer becomes an additional victim.
The answer is neither to deny prisoners basic necessities nor to make an accusation equivalent to guilt. It is to build a system in which genuine offenders face lawful consequences, victims receive meaningful remedies, innocent people are protected and officials answer for proven misconduct.
A poor country cannot afford a criminal justice system that spends endlessly while justice arrives late. Nor can it afford to punish people merely because they are poor.
The principle should be clear: offenders must face the lawful consequences of their crimes, institutions must account for their performance, and taxpayers must not be forced to finance avoidable failures of justice.